A reload option awards a new option for every share tendered to exercise an existing option. We use a sample of 242 firms that adopted reload provisions to investigate claims that firms use reload options to encourage early exercise and increase share ownership (incentive alignment) against the competing claim that reloads transfer wealth from shareholders to managers. We find that CEOs of reload firms tend to have lower levels of ownership and less influence over the Board of Directors than CEOs of firms in a control group. Our results are generally more consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis than the competing wealth transfer (rent extraction) hypothesis.
Introduction
Among the more interesting and controversial trends in executive compensation has been the inclusion of "reload" provisions in employee stock option (ESO) plans.
According to Business Week (1998), reloads were first introduced in 1988 and have steadily grown in popularity. Longnecker and Cross (1992) With a reload provision, if the holder of an ESO tenders previously owned shares to pay the exercise price, the holder receives a new option for each share of stock tendered.
Each new option has a strike price equal to the current market price of the underlying stock and the same maturity date as the original ESO. A key feature of reload options is that they provide the holder some protection against downside risk (see Hemmer et al. 1998 ). This feature underlies the controversy in the business press as to whether reloads serve to align manager's incentives with shareholders or allow managers to extract wealth from the firm and shareholders.
Not surprisingly, firms that adopt reloads, and their advisers, argue the former.
For example, in its 1991 proxy statement Mellon Bank states, "Reload options are intended to encourage earlier exercise of options because optionees will be able to continue to participate in the upside potential of the shares delivered to the Corporation on exercise."
In their August, 1990 High Technology Newsletter, Price Waterhouse states that companies benefit from issuing reload options "... by offering officers and other key employees accelerated and increased share ownership." Finally, compensation consultant, Vytenis Kuraitis (1991) states "A reload option plan is a stock-based plan that not only rewards executives for how well the stock price appreciates, but it also rewards and encourages executives to own stock." Despite these claims, many investors view such plans with suspicion. Because of the downside protection, reload options are strictly more valuable than nonreload options and opponents claim represent a wealth transfer from shareholders to managers. In 1997 the IRRC reported that nearly 50% of the institutional investors surveyed indicated that they would consider voting against a reload plan and that 12% would automatically vote against a reload plan. Business Week (1998) summarized the controversy by quoting compensation consultants Frederick W. Cook and Alan M.
Johnson. While Mr. Cook states that "The greatest thing to happen to stock options since they were invented is the reload," Mr. Johnson states that "They're horrible."
In this paper we conduct empirical tests to examine these claims and evaluate whether reloads represent an attempt to better align incentives, or a means by which managers extract additional wealth from shareholders. We conduct our tests using a sample of 242 firms that have adopted reload provisions and a control group of firms with stock option plans that are matched on size and industry. We conduct three sets of tests.
Our first set of results indicate that firms adopting a reload provision have CEOs with relatively more exercisable options and fewer shares in the year prior to the adoption. In addition, for a sub-sample of the adopting firms for which we can confirm the actual granting of reload options, we find a significant increase in CEO stockholdings (relative to the matched control group) subsequent to the reload adoption. These results prima facie support the claims made by the proponents of reloads, since proponents' claims embody the assertion that increased managerial ownership is in the best interests of the shareholders. However, while increased managerial ownership is a means by which firms can reduce their potential agency costs (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) ), it does not provide unequivocal evidence against the rent extraction claim by reload opponents (since increasing equity ownership of management without increasing the total value of the firm represents a wealth transfer or rent extraction).
Our second set of tests examines the corporate governance structure of the sample firms.
Results show that the adoption of a reload provision is less likely when the CEO has a stronger, more influential position in the firm's corporate governance. Combining both sets of test results leads us to interpret the evidence as being consistent with the claim that firms adopt reload provisions as an incentive alignment mechanism.
In our third set of tests, we explore the specific nature of the likely incentive benefits associated with reload adoption. One advantage to early exercise and share retention is that the convexity of the executive's equity portfolio increases. However, we find no significant differences in the market-to-book ratio and firm risk measures between reload adopters and the control sample both prior to and after adoption of a reload provision, thus providing little support for the convexity explanation. Finding no significant difference in the change in the market to book ratio also suggests that, assuming the net benefits of mitigating manager/shareholder agency problems are value relevant, market participants do not think reloads are particularly effective at aligning managers' incentives with shareholders. Conversely, market participants do not penalize the firm as if they represent a large rent extraction. Thus overall our evidence suggests the following conclusions: reloads appear to be adopted on average for incentive alignment reasons but their benefits (other than early exercise and increased stock ownership) and effectiveness remain elusive. Reloads do not appear as mechanisms for rent extraction in the current set of adopters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we compare a reload option to a nonreload option and further develop the competing claims investigated in this study.
Section 3 discusses the sample selection. Section 4 discusses the operationalization of the hypotheses and presents the results of our tests. Finally, section 5 presents our conclusions and discusses implications for future research.
Reload provisions: Competing claims for adoption
In this section, we first describe the structure of a reload provision. We then discuss how the nature of the provision relates to the competing claims regarding their adoption.
A reload provision states that if the holder of a reload option uses previously owned shares to pay the exercise price, the holder receives one new option for each share tendered. The new option received has an exercise price equal to the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of exercise and the same maturity date as the option exercised. To illustrate the mechanics of this transaction, consider an employee who holds 1,000 stock options with a strike price of $50 per share (which was also equal to the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of grant). If the current value of the underlying stock were $60 per share (representing an increase of 20%), then the employee could exercise the 1,000 options by tendering 833 shares. Because the employee receives credit for the fair market value of the shares tendered, at $60 per share, the 833 shares provide the $50,000 in value necessary to exercise the options.
Upon the exercise of the options, the employee receives 1,000 shares (the number of options exercised) and 833 new options (the number of shares tendered) with an exercise price of $60 per share (and the same maturity date as the original options that were exercised). As a result, the employee exchanges 833 shares and 1,000 options with a strike price of $50 per share for 1,000 shares and 833 options with a strike price of $60 per share. This example illustrates several relevant characteristics of reloads. First, the total number of equity securities (shares plus options) remains the same after the exercise (assuming the shares obtained from exercise are not immediately sold). Therefore, the exercise of a reload option does not change the manager's total equity holdings. Second, the number of shares held increases (in the example the manager holds 167 additional shares). Third, the strike prices of the options held by the employee after exercise reflect any appreciation in the value of the underlying stock. Finally, note that in order to use the reload provision on the options received, the manager must retain some of the shares. For example, if the price increased by another 20% to $72, the employee would need to tender 694 shares ($50,000/$72) to exercise the 833 options. Hemmer, et al. (1998) demonstrate that the early exercise of a reload option dominates holding the option. In short, the dominance results from providing the manager the opportunity to lock-in a portion of the gain, while still retaining the upside potential of the options. To see this, consider the foregoing example. If the employee does not exercise the original options and the market price drops below the $50 strike price, the options expire out-of-the money and the employee receives a zero payoff. On the other hand, if the employee exercises the option (and utilizes the reload provision) she still has the net 167 additional shares resulting from the exercise. At the same time, the employee's total equity holdings are unchanged. Therefore, the employee's gains from future price appreciation remain unchanged. This is in sharp contrast to an option without a reload provision, whereby employees generally sacrifice value when they exercise their options early.
Early exercise and increased share ownership
Based upon the foregoing discussion, reload provisions can result in an increase in managerial share ownership in several ways. First, as noted above, the exercise of a reload option does not change the total number of equity securities held by the manager. This will generally not hold for an option without a reload provision. If the manager uses cashless exercise or sells the shares to pay the strike price to exercise their options, the exercise of the options will reduce the manager's total equity holdings. 1 As a result, without a reload 1 A "cashless exercise" is similar to a reload in that the employee exercises options by tendering shares with a value equal to the total strike price of the options. Because the employee does not have to convert her shareholdings into cash in order to pay the exercise price, such provisions reduce the transactions costs borne by the employee. However, unless the option contains a reload feature, the employee does not automatically receive a new option for each share tendered.
provision, a risk-averse manager can reduce the number of his equity claims by exercising the option prior to maturity.
Second, managers are likely to maintain an inventory of shares in order to exercise reload options in the future. As a result, managers are more likely to retain the shares received from their exercise of options. Although the manager could follow a strategy of selling the shares received from the option exercise and repurchasing shares as needed immediately prior to the exercise of reload options, the manager would incur additional transaction costs from this strategy. In addition, as reported in Table 1 below, some reload plans impose minimum holding period restrictions on the stock received from exercise, and/or include a requisite holding period on shares tendered to pay the strike price, both of which could encourage increased stock ownership. 2 Third, Ofek and Yermack (1997) report that, on average, executives' stock ownership fails to increase after compensation awards of normal ESOs and restricted stock.
They suggest that managers reduce prior stock ownership to mitigate the boards' attempts to tie their wealth to firm value. This evidence calls into question the common assumption that managers cannot hedge the risks of stock-based compensation; they report that managers sell stock when they receive new options, when currently held options move into the money, and when options are exercised. 3 By protecting against the downside risk, reloads offer a hedge that could reduce the incentive to sell other stock to offset the option risk and option gains thus leading to increased managerial stock holdings.
2 Despite appearances, these restrictions might not increase share ownership. Since most managers already hold some stock in the company, the requirement to use previously owned stock might not be binding. For example, prior to adoption, in the pooled sample the mean (median) ratio of CEO shareholdings to option holdings is 13.56 (1.13). Within the reload sample, the mean (median) is 6.81 (1.06). Similarly the requirement to hold stock acquired from exercise of a reload might not increase stock ownership since risk averse managers might sell an equivalent number of previously owned stock to balance their portfolios. 3 Hemmer (1993) develops a model in which the firm hedges the managers' compensation contract. The hedged contract obtains the first best outcome provided the manager undertakes the first best action; if the manager fails to do so, he becomes exposed to risk. Hemmer, et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence of some firms hedging managers' compensation and that this mitigates the incentive of risk averse managers to exercise their ESOs early in order to shed risk. It is not clear how hedging the manager's compensation and reloads might be related, i.e., the sign of the relation is ambiguous, and since a time series of data on compensation for each manager is required to estimate any hedging relation, we do not explore this issue in this paper.
Incentive alignment
The early exercise of options and retention of shares is frequently used by proponents as a justification for the adoption of a reload provision. For example, in their 1993 proxy statement, Alcoa states "This [reload] feature encourages early exercise of options and retention of Alcoa shares." Therefore, if proponents' claims are valid, we would expect managers of firms that adopt reloads to hold more exercisable options (thereby suggesting the need to encourage early exercise) and hold fewer shares (thereby suggesting the need to encourage share retention).
Of course, there are other methods of generating early exercise and increasing managerial ownership. For example, early exercise can be obtained by shortening the ESOs maturity and managerial ownership can be increased by the grant of restricted stock.
While it is not possible to compare reloads to every other conceivable device, we can make the following points. The first is that while the reload encourages early exercise, the firm does not lose the long-term incentives associated with a longer maturity. For example, if a firm chose to encourage early exercise by granting options with shorter maturities, the firm would lose the ESO's incentives as soon as the option was exercised, and the manager would lose the value of the option if the option was out-of-the money at the maturity date.
This differs considerably from a reload provision, which provides an incentive to exercise the option whenever it is in-the-money, but allows the manager to hold the option until the longer maturity date if the option is out-of-the-money.
The second is that, as discussed earlier, the reload provision serves to encourage both the early exercise of options and the retention of the shares. This differentiates the reload from other individual contractual adjustments. One potential advantage associated with linking early exercise and share retention lies with the manner in which the reload alters the manager's portfolio of equity holdings. Recall that in the foregoing example, the manager essentially substitutes 1,000 in-the-money options for 833 at-the-money options and 167 shares. As noted by Lambert, et al. (1991) , as the current market value of the underlying shares increases relative to the strike price, the incentive effect of an option tends to approach that of holding a share of stock. This occurs because the probability of finishing out-of-the money declines and the distribution of option payoffs tends toward a linear, rather than convex, function of the value of the underlying stock. Thus, incentive effects associated with a convex payoff function, such as increased risk taking, are lost. By exercising the reload whenever it is in-the-money a portion of the convexity of the payoff function is maintained. Of course, as pointed out by Lambert, et al., the exact incentive effects are difficult to predict since they depend on factors such as the other components of the manager's compensation, the manager's other firm-specific wealth, personal wealth, and degree of risk aversion.
Thus, although the reload provision is likely to affect the convexity of the payoff function, the specific impact cannot be determined empirically because the manager's personal wealth and degree of risk aversion are not observable to the researcher. As a result, we do not form specific predictions regarding the effects of convexity on reload adoption. Instead, we examine whether there is an empirical relation between reload adoption and measures of risk and growth so as to provide some indirect evidence on the effects of convexity on reload adoption.
Rent extraction
The discussion in the previous section assumes that the adoption of a reload provision is intended to maximize the value of the firm by properly aligning the incentives of management with shareholders' interests. Another possibility is that the reload provision serves as a means of transferring wealth from shareholders to managers. As stated earlier, reload options offer managers downside protection while maintaining the upside potential of the option. As a result, the value of a reload option is strictly greater than that of a nonreload option. 4 In addition, if reloads encourage increased stock ownership (while protecting against the downside risk), reload options offer managers a means to transfer wealth to themselves while arguing that the options serve to align the incentives of managers and shareholders. Alternatively stated, proponents of reloads claim they increase the value of the firm with the increase being shared between shareholders and managers while opponents claim that managers increase their share of the value of the firm at the expense of shareholders.
We hypothesize that rent extraction is more likely to explain reload adoption in firms with strong CEOs and weak governance structures. The ability of the CEO to exert influence over the Board of Directors is referred to as managerial entrenchment (Shliefer and Vishny 1996) and managerial power by Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993, 441) :
"the ability of managers to influence or exert their will or desires on the remuneration decisions made by the board of directors, or perhaps the compensation committee of the board." Lambert et al. predict that the level of an executive's compensation will be an increasing function of the level of managerial power. Lambert, et al. (1993) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1997) report results consistent with this prediction.
The possibility that reload options could be used by executives to extract wealth follows from the Jensen and Murphy (1990) argument that payments to top executives are monitored by political forces. If such forces impose costs on the firm or constrain contracting, CEOs would be interested in extracting wealth without incurring those political costs. Although the additional options granted upon the exercise of a reload are reported, they are typically identified as reload options (thereby suggesting that the amounts are associated with past contractual arrangements) and have low values due to the use of short maturity dates. 5 As a result, a manager with considerable influence over the compensation 4 Hemmer, et al. (1998) provide an example whereby the reload provision increases the value of an option by 50%. A practical guide for using the model to value a reload option can be found in Hemmer, et al. (1999) . 5 For example, Kellogg's 1993 proxy statement states, "In view of the Company's experience and the inherent motivation to exercise options early in their terms because of the reload option feature, new committee and the board of directors could use a reload provision to extract additional wealth from the firm without subjecting the board to additional political scrutiny.
Summary
Ultimately, the issue of whether reloads are granted to increase managerial ownership to align incentives or granted to allow management to extract wealth is an empirical question that we investigate in this paper. Specifically, we compare a sample of firms that have adopted reload options to a matched control sample with ESO plans that have not adopted reload options. We examine whether CEOs of reload adopting firms have more exercisable options and fewer shares at the time of adoption, and whether share ownership increases subsequent to adoption. However, for opponents of reloads, this evidence might not be conclusive since it is not inconsistent with rent extraction either.
Thus we also examine the corporate governance structure of the sample firms (for example, evidence that CEO's of reload adopting firms have greater influence over the board of directors is consistent with those CEOs using reloads to extract additional wealth from the shareholders). Finally, to provide further evidence on the competing claims and insight into the incentive effects of reloads, we investigate whether reloads are used to maintain the convexity in the payoff function. Accordingly, we test whether the adoption of reloads is related to the growth or risk profiles of the firm, and whether these variables exhibit significant change after the adoption of the reload provision. 6
Sample selection
We test the above competing claims using a sample of firms that adopted ESO plans with a reload provision (referred to as the reload or treatment sample) and a sample of firms options were assumed to be outstanding for three years at the time of exercise and reload options for one year for purposes of the [Black-Scholes] model." 6 The Business Week (1998) article also discusses a tax advantage to reloads. With early exercise and retention of the stock, any subsequent price appreciation is taxed at favorable capital gains rates.
using ESOs that did not adopt a reload provision (referred to as the nonreload or control sample). Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our sample selection process, which consists of two sequential stages. First, we search the "proxy" file in the "compny" library of the NAARs database over the 1987 -1995 time period using the search terms "reload option," "restoration option," "replacement option," "continuation option," and "replenishment option." The search identifies a total of 582 firms. Of these, we eliminate 11 foreign firms and 7 "duplicate" firms (these are firms that changed their names during the period and therefore the same firm is in the database under two different names). We next examine the proxy statements for each of the remaining 564 firms to determine whether the selection actually referred to a security that had the characteristics of a reload option. This procedure eliminates 318 firms (primarily cases where the term "replacement option" refers to an exchange of options in the case of a merger or replaced outstanding options with a lower strike price, see Saly (1994) for further discussion of repricing options). The first stage of the sample selection process provides 246 firms.
In the second stage, we conduct a supplementary search of the NAARs SEC filings database using the same search terms. This search provides a list of 195 additional firms.
We examine the source document for each observation and conduct the same screens as in stage 1. As a result, the supplementary search adds 10 additional firms to the sample.
Finally, we searched the ExecuComp database for firms with a positive reload code, which added 8 firms giving a total of 264 firms.
From the preliminary sample of 264 firms, we delete 22 firms that are not included in the Compustat database or for whom financial statement data are missing in the year prior to adoption of the reload provision. This results in 242 sample firms. As a general rule, the adoption year of the reload provision is the year in which the board approved the inclusion of a reload provision in the firm's stock option plan. This year could be explicitly identified for 203 firms. Of these 203 observations, 60 observations represent the case Alternatively stated, lower rates for capital gains encourages early exercise: a claimed advantage of reloads.
where the firm explicitly discussed the adoption of a reload provision in the body of the proxy statement while the remaining 143 observations discussed the provision in an appendix containing the details of the ESO plan being voted on.
In the remaining 39 cases, there is a reference in the proxy statement to reload options being granted under a specific option plan. However, in 16 of these cases, when we examine the specific plan as approved by shareholders, the plan did not mention the reload feature and in the remaining 23 cases we are not able to locate the original plan.
Nevertheless, in these 39 cases, the adoption year of the reload provision is defined as the year of adoption of the original ESO plan. Note that we also rerun our tests excluding these 39 cases with the results qualitatively similar to the tests using the full sample. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of reload adoptions across years. The majority of firms adopted their reload provision in 1990 or later. 7 We identify a control firm for each of the 242 sample firms matched on size, industry and time period that had ESOs outstanding. We use a matched pair approach to control for unidentified differences between firms that might confound the tests. While matching by size and industry is common in accounting research it is not without costs and benefits here. The benefit is that prior research has shown that compensation packages differ across both firm size and industry (Ely 1991, Smith and Watts 1992) and thus controlling for these differences strengthens our ability to make inferences about cause and effect. A further advantage to matching compared to including the matching variables as control variables in a regression model is that the latter approach assumes a linear relation between the dependent variable and the controls. Matching does not impose such a restriction. However, the cost is that some of the variation in the explanatory variables is constrained by matching. Thus, failing to reject the hypotheses of no differences in these variables across the reload and nonreload samples does not necessarily imply that these Note however favorable capital gains treatment did not apply during our sample period. variables are not important explanatory variables. Our design involves examining the incremental ability of the test variables (over and above firm size and industry) to explain reload adoption.
We construct our control sample by selecting the firm within the same 4-digit SIC code that is closest in size to the reload firm. Size is measured as reported total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the year of adoption by the reload firm. For each selected firm, we examine the proxy statement for the adoption year of the matched treatment firm to verify that the executives had ESOs outstanding at the time the treatment firm adopted a reload provision. If the proxy statement is not available or if the firm did not have outstanding ESOs, the potential control firm is dropped and we select the firm next closest in size from the same SIC code. If we could not find a firm in the same 4 digit SIC code we expand the set to 3 digit SIC code (6 cases) or to the 2 digit level (3 cases). We also check that the matched firm did not adopt a reload provision in any subsequent year (up to 1997, the latest year for which we have data).
Panel C of Table 1 presents the industry composition of the reload sample (based on two-digit SIC codes) and of all Compustat firms. The reload sample appears to cover a fairly broad range of industries, and also appears to reflect the industry distribution on Compustat with the possible exception that the reload sample reflects a slightly higher proportion of firms from SIC code 20-29, food and kindred products, than Compustat.
Panel D of Table 1 reports some descriptive data on details of the reload provisions.
Of 53 firms disclosing option vesting requirements, 34 impose a minimum initial vesting period of six months, with 15 firms requiring a one-year vesting period. Of 30 firms disclosing a required holding period for shares tendered to exercise an option, 27 require a minimum six-month holding period. Of 13 firms disclosing a required holding period for 7 Some care should be taken with regard to the interpretation of these figures because the sample is developed primarily from the NAARs data base. The coverage of the NAARs data base has become more complete in recent years.
shares received from the exercise of a reload option, six require a minimum one-year holding period.
Panel A of Table 2 compares the reload sample to the nonreload control sample on selected financial characteristics using data from the year prior to adoption. Since firms were matched on size as measured by total assets, it is not surprising that all size measures reported in panel A do not exhibit significant differences between the two samples. The firms also do not exhibit significant differences in leverage or profitability.
Panel B of Table 2 Finally, Panel C of Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on CEO compensation in the year of adoption. Except for a higher number of options being granted, on average, to CEOs of the reload firms, there is no significant difference in cash compensation (salary and bonus), the dollar value of the option grants and the value of restricted stock grants between the two sets of CEOs.
Empirical tests and results
In this section we describe and present the results of the tests comparing the incentive alignment and rent extraction claims for reload adoption. If firms adopt reloads to align incentives through earlier exercise and increased managerial ownership, we predict that adopting firms have CEOs with higher levels of outstanding exercisable options, lower levels of CEO share ownership prior to adoption, greater increases in CEO share ownership subsequent to adoption than control firms, and strong corporate governance structures (for example, an independent Board of Directors). Conversely, if the adoption of reloads reflects the extraction of additional wealth from the shareholders, based on the results reported by Lambert, et al. (1993) and Core, et al. (1997) , we predict that reload adoption will be associated with a weak governance structure.
In designing the tests, we recognize the conceptual link between managerial ownership and managerial control (influence). That is, the greater a manager's proportional ownership, the greater the manager's influence over the governance of the corporation. A negative association between managerial ownership and reload adoption combined with a negative association between managerial influence and reload adoption would be consistent with the incentive alignment explanation. On the other hand, positive associations would be consistent with the rent extraction explanation. Because it is difficult to separate ownership and influence, we do not include both measures in the same regression. Instead we investigate each individually.
In addition, we conduct the tests on two sets of firms. We first run the analysis on the full set of firms as selected in accordance with the foregoing discussion. However, the sample includes all firms for which we could identify the existence of a reload provision.
We recognize that adopting a reload provision does not require the issuance of reloads at that time. Firms could adopt broad plans that provide the Board of Directors with the greatest amount of flexibility (including the ability to choose to grant reloads someday). To control for this possibility, we run the tests on a subsample of firms for which we could verify the actual issuance of reload options.
Incentive alignment
To assess the incentive alignment explanation for reload adoption, we first examine the claim that reloads are intended to encourage early exercise and increase share ownership. Then, to provide further insight into the incentive effects of reloads, we examine the relation between reload adoption and the growth and risk characteristics of the firm.
If reloads are adopted to encourage the early exercise of ESOs, we would expect firms that adopt reloads to have CEOs with a greater number of exercisable options outstanding than the nonreload firms. 8 In other words, the adoption of a reload provision might be a response to a relatively large accumulation of exercisable options by the CEO.
Firms attach reload provisions to future option grants to prevent such managers from adding to their already large portfolio of exercisable options. (We found little evidence that firms attach a reload to already outstanding options.) Similarly, we predict that reloads would be attached to options with a relatively high probability of finishing in-the-money.
Recall that reloads encourage early exercise of in-the-money options. Therefore, the greater the probability of finishing in-the-money, the greater the probability that the reload will encourage early exercise. We estimate the probability of a newly granted option finishing in-the-money as N(d2) using the dividend-adjusted Black Scholes (1973) model. 9 Supporters also claim that reloads are used to encourage the retention of shares. To assess this claim, we examine whether CEO shareholdings are lower for firms adopting a reload provision than firms not adopting. 10 For cross-sectional aggregation purposes, and 8 Our initial analysis focuses on ex ante variables that proxy for firm characteristics that are consistent with firms wishing to achieve these objectives. Thus, unless otherwise noted, all variables are estimated at the fiscal year end prior to the year of adoption of a reload provision. We later analyze changes in variables to examine whether reloads achieve their stated objective. Finally, to maximize the power of each test, we include all firm observations with non-missing data in each test. 9 Specifically, N(d2) = d1 -σ√T where d1 = log(S/X) -[E(r) -δ + 0.5σ 2 ]T, N(.) is the cumulative normal probability distribution, σ is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns, T is the contract life of the option (set to 10 years), log(S/X) = log(S/S) = 0, E(r) is the expected return on the stock, and δ is the annual dividend yield. The standard deviation is estimated using daily stock returns from CRSP for fiscal year t-1. Dividend yield is estimated as total common dividends for fiscal year t-1 divided by the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. The expected return on the stock is estimated from the capital asset pricing model E(r) = rf + β[E(rm) -rf] where rf is the risk free rate proxied by the annual yield on 10 treasury bonds, β is estimated from the market model using the same return series used to estimate the variance of daily returns, and [E(rm) -rf] is the annual risk premium on the market set at .0424 as per Frankel and Lee (1996) . Since the BS model is derived for traded options assuming hedging, the expected return on the stock is irrelevant and N(d2) is estimated using the risk free rate. However, for non-traded ESOs, the appropriate rate to calculate the probability of finishing in-the-money is the stock's expected return. See Hemmer, et al. (1994) for further discussion of this point. 10 This prediction implicitly assumes that the pre-existing level of stock ownership is exogenously determined by the manager. It is possible that in firms where there are fewer (greater) incentive problems, managers hold lower (higher) equity positions. That is, there is a pre-existing positive relation between the potential incentive problem and stock ownership. Such a relation would reduce our ability to detect a negative relation between the level of managerial ownership and the use of reloads. consistent with prior literature examining management's' equity holdings, we deflate the number of shares held by the CEO by the total number of shares outstanding.
Therefore, we estimate the following regression to investigate the claims that reloads are adopted to encourage early exercise and the retention of shares. Since the dependent variable is binary, we estimate the model using logit. 11 The early exercise variables, CEO% ESO and N(d2) , are predicted to be positively associated with reload adoption, while the CEO equity variable, CEO% SHR , is predicted to be negatively associated with reload adoption. The results on the full sample are reported in Panel A of Table 3 . The overall model correctly classifies 57.3% of the observations. The model also exhibits a chi-square of 8.79, which is significant at the 5% level. As predicted, the coefficient for the CEO% ESO variable is positive and significant (at the 10% level) and the coefficient for the CEO% SHR variable is negative and significant (at the 5% level). The coefficient for N(d2) is not significant. Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with the claims that reloads are adopted to encourage early exercise and the retention of shares. 12
11 Inferences are unchanged if we estimate this and the following models using probit or ordinary least squares. 12 We also estimate equation (1) adding CEO compensation measures as independent variables. We include cash compensation (salary and bonus), the value of new options, and restricted stock grants as separate components. We also estimate the regression using the sum of those components as a measure of total
The results on the reload issuance subsample are reported in Panel B of Table 3 .
We could confirm that 71 of the 242 firms that adopted a reload provision actually issued options with reloads. Of these, 63 have the data required to estimate equation (1). We include each reload firm's match if the match also has the necessary data. The logit regression results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample. The model is significant at the 5% level, 63% of observations are correctly classified, and the CEO% ESO and CEO% SHR variables exhibit significant coefficients in their predicted directions.
To provide further insight into the incentive effects of reloads, we investigate the relation between reload adoption and the growth and risk characteristics of firms. Prior research suggests that firms grant ESOs in order to encourage managers to undertake risky growth opportunities. For example, DeFusco et al. (1990) and Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) provide empirical evidence that a firm's risk profile increases after the adoption of an ESO plan. The convexity of the ESO's payoff distribution increases the manager's expected utility from taking risky projects. However, research has also shown that the convexity of the payoff distribution is reduced as the stock price increases above the exercise price (Lambert, et al. 1991) . As discussed earlier, reloads encourage managers to trade in-the-money options for shares and fewer at-the-money options. Such an exchange is likely to alter the convexity of the manager's equity portfolio. 13 In addition, as shown by Hemmer at al. (1998) and in the numerical example described in section 2, the reload provision offers additional downside protection to the manager. This downside protection could also encourage the manager to undertake risky projects. These arguments suggest low risk firms desiring to increase their risk profile are more likely to include a reload provision in their ESO plan. However, the opposite prediction is also possible; high risk compensation. None of the compensation variables are significant at conventional levels and the qualitative results with regard to the other variables are unchanged. 13 Convexity arguments could also be used to motivate the inclusion of the N(d2) variable. Firms that issue options that have a higher probability of being in-the-money might be concerned about losing the risk firms could also find a reload provision advantageous. High risk firms desiring to protect against the CEO undertaking risk reducing investments (since the CEO is risk averse and wants to protect against the downside risk of in-the-money options) might adopt reloads since reloads protect the CEO against the downside while continuing to offer the upside associated with risky projects. We use the annualized variance of daily security returns as a proxy for firm risk. The variance is estimated using 250 daily returns from fiscal year t-1. 14 Past research indicates that incentive problems are most likely to be greater for firms where much of the value of the firm is imbedded in future growth opportunities (see, for example, Myers 1977 , Smith and Watts 1992 , Gaver and Gaver 1993 , and Guay 1997 .
In a world with asymmetric information between managers and outsiders, where managers have superior private information about the firm's investment opportunity set, it is difficult to evaluate managerial performance in choosing among investments. Thus, the firm (managers and owners) has an incentive to link manager's payoffs more closely to those of owners. By possibly encouraging increased stock ownership and offering downside protection, reloads are more likely to be used by firms where a large part of the firm's value is tied to risky future growth opportunities. We use the market-to-book (M/B) ratio (calculated at the end of fiscal year t-1) to proxy for the firm's future growth opportunities and this argument predicts reload firms will exhibit a higher market-to-book ratio than nonreload firms.
, 15 16 incentives associated with deep in-the money options and thus use reloads to maintain the convexity of the option payoff schedule. 14 We also examine firm beta and leverage as proxies for firm risk. Beta is estimated using the market model which in turn is estimated using 250 daily returns from fiscal year t-1 with the equal-weighted CRSP index (from the same exchange that the firm's returns are extracted). This is the same return series used to estimate the annualized variance of daily security returns. Leverage is estimated as long-term debt divided by total assets, both estimated at the end of fiscal year t-1. Factor analysis of these three variables failed to yield a significant common factor. When we include these proxies individually and all together in the logit model, none exhibit significant coefficients. 15 Baber et al. (1996) extend Gaver and Gaver's (1993) factor analysis approach and examine the correlation among various proxies for the firm's investment opportunity set (IOS) and future ex post realized growth. They find a single factor based on four variables consistently exhibits the highest correlation across years. When we estimate IOS factor scores using data on all available Compustat firms and use the Baber et al. proxy in lieu of the market-to-book ratio, our sample size is substantially reduced (to 40 matched pairs) and The results for the full sample are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . The overall model correctly classifies 57.7% of the observations, the same percentage as equation (1) using just the first three variables.. The model exhibits a chi-square of 11.67 with an associated probability of .04. The coefficients for M/B and Risk are not significantly different from zero while the CEO% ESO and CEO% SHR continue to exhibit significant coefficients in their predicted directions. 17 The results of estimating equation (2) on the reload issuance subsample are reported in Panel B of Table 4 . The results are again qualitatively similar to the full sample results.
Overall, although the results are consistent with firms adopting reloads in order to increase managerial ownership, the desire to increase ownership does not appear to be related to the growth and risk characteristics of the firm.
Rent extraction
the IOS/growth variable is not significantly different between the two samples. When we relax the Baber et al. data definitions and reset data values to 0 for firms with missing values for R&D, capital expenditures, and acquisitions, our sample increases to 112 matched pairs but again the IOS/growth variable is not significantly different between the reload and nonreload samples. 16 Guay (1999) predicts and finds evidence consistent with a positive association between the convexity of the managers' compensation contract (arising from ESOs) and the market-to-book ratio. The market-tobook ratio is a proxy for the firm's risk-related agency problems. 17 We also estimate equation (2) adding CEO compensation measures as independent variables. We include cash compensation (salary and bonus), the value of new options, and restricted stock grants as separate components. We also estimate the regression using the sum of those components as a measure of total compensation. None of the compensation variables are significant at conventional levels and the qualitative results with regard to the other variables are unchanged.
We next examine the relation between the adoption of a reload plan and the CEO's influence over the firm's governance structure. Recall, reload options offer managers valuable downside protection while maintaining the upside potential of the option. The rent extraction explanation suggests that reload options are more likely to be adopted if the CEO dominates or heavily influences the board of directors. Thus, we examine the relation between the adoption of a reload and variables that proxy for the strength of the CEO's influence over the governance structure of the firm. Rent extraction would be consistent with a positive association between reload adoption and proxies for the CEO's influence over the board. On the other hand, observing a negative association between reload adoption and proxies for the CEO's influence is consistent with reloads being used to align the CEO's incentives.
Prior literature has used a number of variables that reflect a firm's corporate governance structure. Our approach is to use factor analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the set of explanatory variables. Reducing the number of variables mitigates spurious significance and reduces concern with multicolinearity, thereby increasing the power of the tests, and allowing us to make more direct inferences about the underlying constructs.
Jensen (1993, 865) suggests board size is important "When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less frequently able to function effectively and are easy for the CEO to control." A board composed mostly of outside directors is also more likely to restrict the CEO's ability to extract rents. Jensen (1993, 864) further suggests that "encouraging outside board members to hold substantial equity interests would provide better incentives" for boards to monitor the CEO and firm performance. Jensen (1993, 866 ) also argues that "The function of the chairman (of the board) is to run board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensation of the CEO.
Clearly, the CEO cannot perform this function apart from his or her personal interest. ...
Therefore, for the board to be effective, it is important to separate the CEO and chairman positions." Similar arguments apply to the case when the CEO is from the firm's founding family. Finally, the longer the CEO has held that position, the more likely the CEO has influence over the Board.
The compensation committee is an important board committee responsible for designing and approving the compensation package of top management including the CEO.
As reported in Table A2 of the Appendix, 96 percent of the reload firms report the existence of a compensation committee compared to 94 percent for the nonreload sample (the difference is not significant at conventional levels). Further, 12 (17) percent of the reload (nonreload) firms report the existence of a stock option committee (again this difference is not significant). Similar reasoning for the adoption of a reload provision applies to the compensation committee as to the board of directors. A positive association between reload adoption and the percentage of outside directors on the compensation committee is consistent with using reloads to align incentives whereas a negative association is consistent with rent extraction (an insider controlled compensation committee is more likely to allow rent extraction via reload grants). For example, Newman and Wright (1995) report that CEOs of firms with insiders on the compensation committee receive both higher levels of total compensation and more stock options. Yermack (1997) reports evidence consistent with CEO influence over the compensation committee leading to rent extraction by CEO's timing the award of stock options just prior to increases in their firms' stock prices. We further partition outside directors on the compensation committee into two groups: independent and gray. Gray directors "are outside directors that have some nonboard affiliation with the firm. Gray directors are a potential source of violation of board independence because of their other affiliations with management." (Beasley 1996, 448) .
The final set of variables we examine under corporate governance relates to outside blockholders. Outside blockholders are hypothesized to have greater incentives to monitor managers since they are less subject to the free rider problems associated with smaller shareholdings (see, for example, Jensen 1993 , Shleifer and Vishny 1996 , Mehran 1995 .
With weak outside monitoring, managers are predicted to be more likely to award themselves bonus compensation such as reload options thus leading to a prediction of a negative association between reload adoption and outside blockholder variables. However, incentive alignment predicts a positive association between reload adoption and outside blockholder variables. 18 Thus we perform factor analysis using twelve variables: two variables for board size, one continuous and one a dummy variable for whether the firm has greater than eight committee exhibits a negative loading. Given these factor loadings, we label this factor as CEO strength: the higher the factor score, the greater the CEOs influence. 19 Factor 3 exhibits large positive loadings on both board size variables and a significant negative loading on the percent of outside directors on the board. Thus, based on Jensen's (1993) arguments about larger boards being less able to function effectively and the negative loading on outside directors, we label this factor as board strength (Board strength) noting that the higher the factor score, the weaker the board. We examine the explanatory ability of these three factors in the following model:
where Board is the factor score for the board of director variables, CEO is the factor score reflecting the CEO's influence, and OSBH is the factor score reflecting the influence of the outside blockholders.
Reload adoption is more likely the result of rent extraction if the board of directors is weak and the CEO is strong and outside blockholders are absent or hold few shares.
Thus rent extraction predicts a positive coefficient on board strength (since board strength is decreasing in the factor score), a positive coefficient on CEO strength and a negative coefficient on outside blockholders. Opposite signs, i.e., b 1 < 0, b 2 < 0, and b 3 > 0, would favor the incentive alignment motive over rent extraction. 20 The results of logit estimation of equation (3) on the full sample are presented in Panel A of Table 5 . The model correctly classifies 57.9% percent of the observations. The model also exhibits a chi-square of 11.78 with an associated probability of 1%. Thus, the model is significant at conventional levels. The three factors exhibit coefficients with signs 19 Four of the five significant variables support this interpretation with the percentage of outside directors on the board being the exception. Offsetting this however, CEO as chair of the board exhibits the next largest loading and is positive reinforcing our labeling this factor as CEO strength. 20 Pursuant to our earlier discussion of CEO stock ownership and CEO influence, we exclude CEO ownership from the factor analyses and the above regression. Consistent with the earlier discussion, CEO ownership is significantly negatively correlated with the Board strength factor (r=-0.34) and significantly positively correlated with the CEO strength factor (r=0.51).
consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis and inconsistent with rent extraction.
However, only the CEO factor coefficient is significant. Thus, the stronger the CEO's influence (by, for example, CEO from the founding family, longer tenure, CEO as chair, percentage of officers on the compensation committee), the less likely the firm is to adopt a reload provision. 21 As before, we also conduct the analysis on the subsample of firms for which we are able to verify the issuance of reloads. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5 . The results are qualitatively to those for the full sample: the stronger the CEO's influence, the less likely the firm is to adopt a reload provision. When these results are combined with the logit results in Table 3 indicating that CEOs of reload firms have significantly lower stock ownership, we conclude that these results favor incentive alignment over rent extraction as an explanation for the adoption of reloads. The results are not consistent with CEOs using their influence over the board to adopt reloads in order to extract additional rents.
Post-adoption analysis
In order to provide insight into the effects of reloads, we investigate ex-post changes in observable firm characteristics after the reload adoption. 22 Specifically, we measure the changes in the incentive related variables from t-1 to t+3. Note however, we might not observe significant changes in manager's equity holdings (or in other variables) even though reloads are intended to align incentives since reloads might be ineffective at 21 We also estimate equation (3) adding CEO compensation measures as independent variables. We include cash compensation (salary and bonus), the value of new options, and restricted stock grants as separate components. We also estimate the regression using the sum of those components as a measure of total compensation. When we include the compensation components as independent variables, the estimated coefficient for board strength is significantly negative (p < 0.03), which is consistent with incentive alignment. The remaining results are unchanged. 22 If firms adopt a reload provision to encourage early exercise, an obvious test is to examine whether reloads are, in fact, exercised earlier. However, financial statement and proxy disclosures do not allow us to gather the data necessary to test for differences in exercise behavior. Prior to proxy disclosures in 1993 it is difficult to construct exercise patterns for a sample of firms and post-1993 one cannot determine whether the options exercised were previously held nonreload options or new reload options. Similar problems restrict achieving their objective. Thus these tests also provide some evidence on the effectiveness of reloads in achieving their hypothesized objectives.
The results for the full sample are presented in Panel A of Table 6 . We conduct matched pair univariate tests in this section because requiring post-adoption data leads to a substantial decline in sample size across the variables examined. In calculating the change in CEO stock holdings, a firm-pair observation is excluded if the identity of the individual holding the CEO position changed in either firm pair during the test period surrounding the adoption year. We find a slight increase in the CEOs percentage shareholding, but the increase is not significant nor is it significantly different from the change in CEO shareholdings of the nonreload sample.
We find no significant shifts in the risk profile of the firm. We do find that the market-to-book ratio exhibits a significant increase for the reload sample. However, this increase is not significantly different from the increase in the M/B ratio for the nonreload sample. Thus the increase in the market-to-book ratio for the reload sample is also consistent with the increase in the stock market over the sample period.
The results when we restrict the analysis to firms for which we could confirm the actual of issuance of reloads are presented in Panel B of Table 6 . The only difference from the full sample is that there is now a significant increase in CEO shareholdings relative to the control group. The other changes remain insignificant. These results suggest that while many firms adopted reload plans did not actually issue reload options, those that did issue reload options experienced an increase in CEO share ownership. No difference in the change in market to book ratio suggests that market participants do not think reloads are particularly effective at aligning managers' incentives with shareholders (conversely, market participants do not penalize the firm as if they represent a large rent extraction). 23 us from conducting a powerful test of whether post-adoption the manager's portfolio of exercisable options is, on average, closer to the money. 23 Comparing changes in market to book ratios pre-post-adoption is similar to examining security returns over a long window around some event. Warner (1980 and 1985) indicate that narrow event windows are more powerful than long event windows at detecting market reactions. However, it is difficult
We also examine whether the adoption of a reload plan is associated with other changes in the CEO's compensation contract. In particular, we are interested in whether there is a substitution effect, whereby firms offset the additional value of the reload feature by reducing other forms of compensation. To investigate this issue we collect CEO compensation data from Execucomp for three years subsequent to the adoption of the reload plan. For total compensation, and compensation components, we compute the differences between the average amount for those three years to the amounts in the year of adoption (which are summarized in Panel C of Table 2 ). 24 Due to sample size considerations, we are unable to maintain the matched-pairs in our analysis. Instead, we compare the mean values of the compensation changes between the two samples. The results are shown in Table 7 .
We find no significant differences in the changes in cash compensation or restricted stock grants between the two samples. Although the average salary increase for the CEOs for the nonreload sample exceeded the salary change for the CEOs of the reload sample, the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, although the CEOs of the reload firms received a greater increase in their average bonus and in the value of restricted stock grants than the CEOs of the nonreload firms, the differences are not significant.
On the other hand, the managers of reload firms received a significantly higher increase in the value of option grants and total compensation relative to the managers of nonreload firms. While on the surface these results are more consistent with rent extraction than incentive alignment, care must be taken in interpreting this finding. In particular, as noted in footnote 24, the assumption that all options received by the CEOs of reload firms carry the reload provision could overstate the value of the CEO's option compensation. To to identify event dates in reload adoption and issuance and thus we must use the long event window approach. Thus, one explanation for the market to book results is low power tests. 24 The values for most of the measures were extracted directly from Execucomp. A notable exception is the value of reload grants. For the reload firms, we make the simplifying assumption that all options granted subsequent to the reload adoption contained a reload provision. We then use the algorithm described in Hemmer, et al (1999) to value the reload option, using a risk-free rate of 6% per year and 20 nodes in the assess the potential bias, we also compute the differences in the changes in the value of option grants using the Execucomp Black-Scholes option values for both groups. The results (not reported) indicate that although the increase in the value of the options granted to the reload group still exceeds the increase for the nonreload group, the difference is no longer significant (t = 1.467).
Finally, we regress the change in the value of the option grants against the changes in the other compensation components (all compensation numbers are deflated by firm size in order to facilitate the cross-sectional aggregation). Due to the small sample size (61 observations) we view these results as preliminary and do not report them in tables.
However, for the control firms, we find a significant positive association between the change in salary and the change in option values, which is consistent with a positive correlation between compensation components. Of more interest, we find a significant negative coefficient (t = -2.727) for the interaction between the change in salary and the reload dummy variable. This suggests that the positive association between changes in salary and changes in the value of option grants is lower for reload firms, which is not consistent with rent extraction. 25
Summary and conclusions
Reload options are a relatively recent innovation in ESO contracts that have the unique property of encouraging early exercise by providing executives with a dominant exercise strategy of exercising any time the option is in-the-money. In this paper we examine the claims of the issuers of reload options and their advisors that reloads are granted to align incentives by encouraging early exercise and the retention of shares against a competing explanation that reloads are used by influential executives to extract additional wealth.
binomial tree. The assumption that all option grants include the reload provision likely overstates the value of option compensation for the reload firms.
Our findings indicate that the adoption of a reload plan is negatively related to a measure of the CEO's influence over the Board of Directors and the CEO's ownership of shares. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the claim that reloads are intended to encourage early exercise and increase share retention. Despite the fact that the reload provision can increase the value of an option by a substantial amount, our evidence is not consistent with CEOs using reloads to extract additional wealth from shareholders. Thus, although recent papers suggest that factors other than incentive alignment could influence the design of executive compensation contracts (see Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Core et al. (1997) for compensation in general and Yermack (1995 Yermack ( , 1997 and Ofek and Yermack (1997) for employee stock options in particular) we find no support for such factors with regard to reload adoption.
Therefore, our findings are consistent with firms using reloads to influence CEO stock option exercise patterns and share retention. In addition to the implications for option valuation, this suggests that issuing firms perceive some benefit to the early exercise of options and the retention of shares. However, the specific nature of the benefits associated with early exercise remain unclear. One advantage to early exercise and share retention is that the convexity of the executive's equity portfolio increases. However, we find no significant differences in the market-to-book ratio and firm risk measures between reload adopters and the control sample both prior to and after adoption of a reload provision, thus providing no support for the convexity explanation. Observing no significant increase in the market-to-book ratio for the reload adopters relative to the control sample also suggests that market participants consider the benefits (and costs) of reloads to be relatively small compared to the value of the firm. Thus our evidence suggests the following conclusions:
reloads appear to be adopted on average for incentive alignment reasons but their benefits (other than early exercise and increased stock ownership) and effectiveness remain elusive.
Reloads do not appear as mechanisms for rent extraction in the current set of adopters. If 25 Similar, though weaker, results are found when we combine all of the other compensation components the benefits of reloads are minimal and some external groups continue to dislike them we expect a reduction in their usage at least among firms wishing to mitigate agency problems. 26 Finally, it should be noted that the power of our tests is reduced by the reliance upon publicly available data. In particular, we are unable to identify which options in the CEO's portfolio or which options exercised, carry reload provisions. Thus, we are unable to directly measure the effects of the reload provision on the manager's incentives. In addition, many of the public disclosures regarding the reload provision fail to state whether there are important restrictions on the manager's ability to use the reload provision.
(salary, bonus, and restricted stock) into one variable. 26 As noted by the referee, it is also possible that reloads are a harmless mutation introduced by compensation consultants and that they will eventually fade away. Leverage is long term debt divided by total assets (d9/d6). Return on assets is income divided by total assets (d18/d6). Financial data from the fiscal year prior to year of adoption of a reload provision.
Compustat firms excluding reload sample firms. Financial statement data for fiscal year 1993. Return on assets here excludes observations ROA < -100%. *significant at .01 level (two-tailed test). Option grants $ = estimated value of option grants to CEO in adoption year. Estimated using BSOPM with expected term algorithm suggested in Hemmer, at al. (1994) . **significant at .10 level (two-tailed test). Notes: Reload = 1 if firm adopted an ESO reload provision, 0 otherwise. CEO% ESO = number of options held by CEO as percentage of total shares outstanding. N(d2) = probability of a newly granted option with S=X finishing in-the-money, N(d2) from BSOPM. CEO% SHR = number of shares held by CEO as percentage of total shares outstanding.
NP indicates no prediction. * significant at .05 level (one-or two-tailed as appropriate). ** significant at .10 level (one-or two-tailed as appropriate). Notes: Reload = 1 if firm adopted an ESO reload provision, 0 otherwise. CEO% ESO = number of options held by CEO as percentage of total shares outstanding. N(d2) = probability of a newly granted option finishing in-the-money, N(d2) from BSOPM. CEO% SHR = number of shares held by CEO as percentage of total shares outstanding. M/B = market-to-book ratio of shareholders' equity. Risk = annualized daily stock return variance estimated over the 250 days of fiscal year t-1. * significant at .05 level (one-or two-tailed as appropriate). ** significant at .10 level (one-or two-tailed as appropriate). Notes: Reload = 1 if firm adopted an ESO reload provision, 0 otherwise. Board = factor score for board of directors strength (higher score, less independence). CEO = factor score for CEO's influence over the board. O/S B/H = factor score for strength of outside blockholders. * significant at .05 level (one-or two-tailed as appropriate). Tables 3 and 4 . Each change variable, denoted ∆, represents the difference between the variable estimated post-adoption and the variable estimated pre-adoption of a reload provision. Formally V = (Vpost -Vpre) where the subscript denotes measurement post-or pre-adoption of a reload provision. N denotes the number of matched pairs. The t statistic tests for a significant difference in the change between the two samples. ** significant at .10 level (one-tailed). firm-pair observations excluded if the identity of the CEO changed over the test period. The t statistic tests for a significant difference in the mean change between the two samples. * Significant at .05 level (two-tailed).
For each variable, changes are measured as the difference between the average value for years t+1, t+2 and t+3 less the value for the variable at t. For reload firms the value of the option grants is estimated following the algorithm in Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (1999) , using 20 nodes in the binomial tree. For non-reload firms, the value of the option grants is the Black-Scholes value of the grants from Execucomp. Total compensation is equal to the sum of salary, bonus, value of option grants and value of restricted stock grants.
Appendix.

Results of univariate comparisons.
This appendix reports the results of matched pair univariate comparisons of all variables included in logit regressions and the variables included in the factor analyses. The results are presented for descriptive purposes. We note however that in all cases where a significant difference is observed between the reload and the reload sample, the results with the exception for the % outside directors on the board, are consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis Together with the results reported in the paper, we conclude that the evidence is consistent with incentive alignment as an explanator for reload adoption. Notes: N(d2) = probability of a newly granted option with S=X finishing in-the-money, N(d2) from BSOPM. Max. unreal. option gains $mm = maximum unrealized option gain reported by top five officers. Prior year indicates gain is from proxy statement issued year prior to adoption year. Adoption year indicates gain is from adoption year proxy statement. M/B = market value of equity to book value of equity (d199*d25/d60). Beta = market model beta using equally-weighted CRSP index, estimated over the 250 days of fiscal year t-1. Stock return variance = annualized daily stock return variance estimated over same time period as beta. Leverage = long term debt to total assets. * indicates significance at least at the .05 level (one or two-tailed as appropriate). ** indicates significance at least at the .10 level (one or two-tailed as appropriate).
Table A2
Predictions and results for incentive alignment and rent extraction variables with respect to firms adopting reload options.
* indicates significance at least at the .05 level (one or two-tailed as appropriate). ** indicates significance at least at the .10 level (one or two-tailed as appropriate).
x Denotes a chi-square test statistic is reported (since the test variable is a dummy variable) with the associated two-tailed probability. This probability is virtually identical to that derived from a t test.
